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Abstract:-  The need for computer intrusion forensics arises from 
the alarming increase in the number of computer crimes that are 
committed annually. After a computer system has been breached 
and an intrusion has been detected, there is a need for a 
computer forensics investigation to follow. Computer forensics is 
used to bring to justice, those responsible for conducting attacks 
on computer systems throughout the world. Because of this the 
law must be follow precisely when conducting a forensics 
investigation. It is not enough to simple know an attacker is 
responsible for the crime, the forensics investigation must be 
carried out in a precise manner that will produce evidence that is 
amicable in a court room. For computer intrusion forensics many 
methodologies have been designed to be used when conducting an 
investigation. With the birth of the Internet and networks, the 
computer intrusion has never been as significant as it is now. 
There are different preventive measures available, such as access 
control and authentication, to attempt to prevent intruders.   
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are developed to detect an 
intrusion as it occurs, and to execute countermeasures when 
detected. Intrusion detection (ID) takes over where preventive 
security fails. In order to choose the best IDS for a given system, 
one should be aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
each IDS. This paper views a forensic application within the 
framework of Intrusion Detection and details the advantages and 
disadvantages of IDS. 
 
Keywords: - Intrusion Detection System, Network Forensic, 
IP Spoofing. 
 
I.  INTRUSION FORENSIC 
 
A computer intrusion is, “Any intentional event where an 
intruder gains access that compromises the confidentiality, 
integrity, or the availability of computers, networks, or the 
data residing on them.”  
The amount of damage done by an intruder to a system can 
vary greatly.  Some intruders are malicious in nature and 
others are just curious and want to explore what is on a local 
network.  Computer users must protect themselves from 
intrusion.  While there are no 100% effective methods of 
eliminating intruders completely, some methods must be used 
to reduce intrusions.  In the event that an intrusion has taken 
place the last line of defense is an intrusion detection system.  
An intrusion detection system can alert the system 
administrator in the event that the system has been breeched.   
Once the intrusion detection system has detected an event, an 
intrusion forensics investigation should be conducted to note 
the extent of the intrusion and any damages that may have 
occurred and to locate the source of the attack. 
 
II.  INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS AND ITS FORENSIC 
APPLICATIONS    
Although the main  aim of IDSs is to detect intrusions to 
prompt  evasive measures, a further aim can be to supply 
evidence in criminal and civil legal proceedings  [7]  .  The 
ultimate goal of Intrusion Detection is to identify, preferably 
in real-time, unauthorized use, misuse, and abuse of computer 
systems by both systems insiders and external penetrations.  In 
the case of anomaly intrusions, intrusion detection is based on 
the idea that the anomalies that may surface in a system are 
symptoms indicating illegal, intrusive or criminal  activity.  
The ultimate goal, with a view to a forensic application 
however, would be to obtain sufficient evidence to in order to 
trace the crime back to the criminal. Within a computer system 
the natural blanket of anonymity afforded the criminal 
encourages destructive behavior while making it extremely 
difficult for law enforces to prove the identity of the criminal.  
Therefore, the ability to obtain a fingerprint of system users 
and their typical behavior is imperative in order to acquire 
some  hold on identifying the perpetrator.  The study of 
available log files would always be uses as fundamental in 
evidence collection.  However, many times at a higher level it 
is necessary to posses a more in-depth ability to narrow the 
field or even establish a list of possible suspects. As we all 
know, the computer crime is always the result of human 
activity on a system, be it system users or intruders.  So at this 
level, it is not only desirable to have some logging activity to 
provide evidential information, but also some mechanism to 
collate and collect profile of system users. Intrusion detection 
systems can form a starting point that can be used by a 
computer forensics investigator.  
III.  INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 
 IDS have historically been categorized as network-, host-, 
anomaly-  or misuse-  (signature-) based. This simple 
categorization is, however, no longer adequate. IDS can also 
be distributed or centralized, can be passive or reactive, can be 
application-specific or general-purpose, can focus on real time 
or after-the-event analysis. The five IDS described later are not 
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categories, but are presented as an indication of how major 
trends have developed. Almost all IDS will output a small 
summary line about each detected attack. This summary line 
typically contains the information fields shown below. 
 
1. Time/date; 
2. Sensor IP address; 
3. Vendor specific attack name; 
4. Standard attack name (if one exists); 
5. Source and destination IP address; 
6. Source and destination port numbers; 
7. Network protocol used by attack. 
 
Other more general information is also often provided; 
information such as a textual description of the attack, 
identification of the software attacked, information that 
identifies the patches required to fix the vulnerability, and 
advisories regarding the attack. 
IV.  AIM OF INVESTIGATION AND FORENSIC ANALYSIS 
In investigating a possible computer intrusion, investigators 
will sift through large amounts of log data from the targeted 
system and/or network of computers, possibly having in mind 
also the evidential nature of such information for subsequent 
court proceedings. A simple analysis may examine event 
records contained wholly within the one event log, while more 
sophisticated analyses will examine event records across 
several event logs. The intention of such analysis is typically 
to confirm or deny the occurrence of suspicious activities that 
is, activities which constitute successful or unsuccessful 
attempts to make illegal use  of a system, or which may 
facilitate or are intended to facilitate the illegal use of a 
system. For example, in response to a simple compromise of a 
user account, the analysis may consist of as little as a simple 
search of an event log to locate any record which indicates 
recent access to the password file—legal or illegal—by any 
user. This in itself involves no across-event analysis, that is, no 
interevent correlation. Alternatively, in the investigation of 
large-scale network intrusion, the analysis may be far more 
sophisticated and involve analysis of event records across a 
range of computer or network event logs, as well as external 
information such as transaction logs from utilities, such as 
phone companies and communication services. 
 
In any case, the analyst aims essentially to determine the Who, 
What, When, and Where of suspicious or illegal activities: 
 
1.  Who: This relates to attribution: who is responsible 
for the activity (this can be difficult to determine as 
the intention of the attacker is often to disguise his 
identity by masquerading as a legitimate user). 
2.  What:  This relates to impact determination and 
motive: what has the attacker done, for example, files 
accessed and the mode of access (read, write, or 
execute), the network traffic generated, the network 
nodes targeted, and the user accounts attacked 
(again, an attacker will often attempt to disguise what 
they have done or possibly even delete entire logs or 
individual log records in order to hide their 
activities).   
3.  When: This relates to the time of each event in order 
that an accurate picture can be drawn of the 
sequence of activities employed by the attacker. 
 
4.  Where:  This relates to identifying the location or 
identity of the computer from where the attacker 
operated (once again, an attacker will often attempt 
to falsify his apparent computer address, that is, 
his/her IP address, and operate through intermediary 
computers—giving rise to the terms connection 
laundering and stepping stone—in order to frustrate 
this). 
 
The Why and the How too are important, these will shed light 
on how best to mitigate against such activity in future. These 
relate to : 
 
5.  Why:  Is the intrusion to do with hacking, political 
motives, revenge, financial fraud, other criminal 
activities?  
 
6.  How:  What were the tools employed, the 
vulnerabilities exploited? Can the scenario be 
reconstructed? one of the crucial items of information 
that appears in event log records is the time at which 
a logged event took place, the so-called time attribute 
of the event—the when.  
 
This is important as a computer intrusion or attack consists 
typically of a specific sequence of events—an attack 
scenario—and knowing the sequence or order in which the 
events occurred is important in identifying the nature of the 
attack and hence the who, what, and where are referred to 
above. The general objective of event sequencing and event 
correlation is to identify the presence of temporal and other 
relationships between events in order to assess whether an 
attack has occurred or is occurring by matching a set of related 
events against known attack scenarios. 
V.  FORENSIC ANALYSIS STRATEGIES  
As soon as we have recognized, that our system is under 
attack, we have to understand all methods, an intruder can use 
to gather some information about our system. The primary job 
of an forensic investigator is to preserve as much evidentiary 
data at the crime scene and in any usable form. In doing so, 
evidentiary information can be a sequence of network packets 
(used for OS detection), malformed packets, and packets from 
forged sources (in as much as it can be proved in IPv4). IP 
Spoofing is the one of the major problem in backtracking the 
intruders. It helps the intruders to hide  his original 
identification. IP spoofing is discussed separately in the next 
section. 
 
A.  Intrusion Detection System Investigation 
 
The problem is that it is unsure that network security services 
are appropriate tools to collect evidences during ongoing 
attacks. But whereas classical forensic analysis is limited to 
“post-mortem” analysis (of already pathological victims), a 
real time forensic analysis can give us a theoretical chance to 
find some evidences about “maybe more intrusive” next steps. 
Intrusive attacks can be classified on-the-fly and appropriate 
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can be derived from recorded malicious traffic.  The next 
section discusses all the technical steps and process which can 
help to collect the evidence from the targeted system and to 
trace the intruders back to his cave.  
 
B.  Event Log Analysis 
 
Most operating systems have some sort of facility for 
recording event data. For example, UNIX systems can record 
log-ins and log-outs, user command histories, root access 
events, and ftp logs. Some operating systems can potentially 
collect large streams of security data. For example, Microsoft 
Windows 2000 has the capability to collect log-on activity, the 
files that users access, the programs that users run, and the 
operations that administrators perform. Unfortunately, skilled 
attackers have many ways  of avoiding detection, namely 
disabling the collection of, or deleting or hiding this log 
evidence, producing large quantities of noise events to 
purposely fill up the log data files prior to penetration, and 
modifying the computer operating system. However, in many 
cases, the attacker may not cover all of his/her tracks and 
remnants of log activity may still be found in the system. 
 
While Microsoft Windows 2000/XP has a comprehensive 
functionality for logging security-related events, this needs to 
be explicitly enabled to be effective. There exist many 
different types of events included in three default logs: 
application logs, system logs, and security logs. Examples of 
event types are log-on failure, opening an object, deleting an 
object and so on. However, some events have cryptic 
descriptions and many are relatively unimportant in the 
context of security needs. Furthermore, this capture of security 
related events provides very little in the way of real-time 
monitoring or notification of suspicious activities, analyzing of 
logs, fusing, and correlating of networked computer logs. The 
next sections focus on some of the technical and challenging 
issues for event time correlation. 
i) Events Time Correlation 
 
Time is a critical component in any criminal investigation. 
Time-lining is concerned with ordering events of interest in 
time, with the intention of obtaining an overview of the 
sequence of events and an insight into cause and effect 
relationships and motive. The technique is sufficiently 
important and applicable across forensics in general. 
 
The prosecution of hackers generally involves piecing together 
a large number of items of evidence that have different time 
attributes.  Such evidence includes telephone call records, 
people movements, sounds, forensic  analysis of accessories, 
and witness testimonies. A major problem for the prosecution 
and defense is organizing, time sequencing, correlating, and 
presenting all this information. When a criminal investigation 
involves a computer, or a network of computers, the 
complexity of the time sequence and correlation phases 
increases significantly due to potential explosion in the 
amount of additional time related information or evidence 
contributing to the investigation. 
 
The additional information can come from computers and 
servers distributed over different geographical sites; such as 
from local and networked peripheral devices, from network 
transit nodes (e.g., routers), from back-up media, and from 
network data. Such information can be sourced from 
computers running different operating systems (which may 
interpret time in different ways) in different countries covering 
multiple time-zones. Evidence with a time attribute can, for 
example, include the following: 
 
1.  Log-on and log-off events; 
2.  Internet browsing site location and content and chat 
room activities; 
3.  Application usage (file transfer and software usage); 
4.  E-mail communication events; 
Figure:-1 – Time-Lining Sequence Diagram 
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accessing documents); 
6.  Router log events. 
 
Techniques that simplify the process of accurately identifying, 
correlating and establishing the sequence of evidence 
timestamps and aid the investigator visualize these timestamps 
are therefore required. Time-lining is one simple technique. A 
time line is a one-dimensional time-ordered linear display of 
the evidence timestamps. It marshals time-related events into a 
chronological sequence where one or more evidence type can 
be simultaneously displayed on the time line. Time-lining is 
useful, for example, for Identifying time-related patterns (e.g., 
periodic events, timestamp fingerprints such as operating 
systems file Modification-Access-  Creation (MAC) 
timestamps). It helps in: 
 
•  Cross correlating different time sequences; 
•  Correlating these sequences with other physical 
evidence. 
 
We note in passing that time-lining is helpful in broadly 
identifying the timing sequence of evidence and its 
relationship to other evidence but, as a tool by itself, will not 
automatically undertake any correlation or extract any cause-
effect dependencies. This, currently, is still left to the 
investigator to complete.  Figure 1:-  shows the example of 
time-lining sequence diagram. Time-lining forensic tools are 
available in Encase (Guidance Software) [5].  
 
ii) Event Time Frames 
 
While a time-line is a convenient way of displaying time-
related evidence, a time-line has no inherent understanding of 
time offsets such as those created by differences in time-zones 
nor of the time difference between real or wall-clock time and 
what the computer thinks it is. As a result, errors in the 
interpretation of the time line could occur, thereby making the 
ordering of events by time difficult, if not impossible. To 
overcome such errors, time referencing and adjustment 
features need to be incorporated into the forensic analysis 
procedure that allows the investigator to deal with different 
time references that might be found both within and across the 
various case data sets. Leaving aside for the moment, 
considerations of informal time, there are essentially two 
separate issues affecting time information or timestamps: 
 
•  That of time zones or relative time; 
•  That of clock synchronization. 
If time-lining is being carried out within a single time-zone, 
then the first is not an issue but clock synchronization is. That 
is, in comparing the event  timestamps of event records from 
different computers or different sources, there is the need to 
ensure that the clocks of the two computers or sources are 
synchronized with each other and with real or wall-clock time 
and were so at the time the events were recorded. This applies 
even in cases where there is only a single computer system 
being investigated or seized, since there is still the need to 
relate computer time (i.e., the timestamps of the events 
recorded on that computer system) to real or wall-clock time. 
 
Noting the time in this way will provide the basis for 
subsequently allowing the necessary adjustments to be made 
to the various timestamps when carrying out the time-lining to 
ensure that these adjusted times are comparable to each other 
and with real or wall-clock time. When there are several time 
zones involved, there is then the additional need to ensure that 
the timestamps are adjusted to a common time zone for 
purposes of comparability unless they have already been so 
adjusted. Typically this means adjusting timestamps to what 
used to be known as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), now 
known as Universal Coordinated Time (UTC). To achieve 
this, the time-lining and analysis logic needs to have access to 
time-zone information for all timestamps (or to know that all 
timestamps are UTC + 0) and to incorporate that knowledge 
when comparing and processing timestamp information. To 
summarize, case data may be sourced from different machines 
with possibly different operating systems, from different time 
zones, and may be subject to time zone variations also. For 
example, an e-mail has multiple time event information—file 
timestamps, send timestamps, receive timestamps, transit route 
timestamps. Each one of the related timestamps may have to 
be treated differently. The above discussion focuses on time as 
determined by geographical location on the Earth’s surface 
and time readings whether from computers or clocks which 
provide a local time frame.  
 
C.  IP Spoofing  
 
IP spoofing is the most popular mechanism to hide the trace of 
an attacker, or is part of an indirect attack (e.g. SMURF 
attack). Spoofed addresses can be used to hide one's network 
identity or to direct return packets to another host/target. 
Spoofed addresses can also be used to masquerade as another 
host that is possibly trusted by the target host. Due to the 
problems with IPv4, IP-spoofing detection is the basic element 
of uncertainness in classifying the quality of collected forensic 
evidences.  
 
i) Back Tracking  
 
Back tracking spoofed packets is easy in principle. Assuming 
the attack is ongoing, one determines which router at the target 
site the attack flow is coming from, call it router Z. One logs 
into router Z, and determines from which interface/router the 
attack is coming from, call it router W. Then one logs into 
router W, and so forth. In practice, backtracking is 
complicated by the following:  
 
 
 
•  It is a slow manual process.  
•  The flow must stay active during the trace back, 
much like tracing a phone call  
•  The flow may come from multiple sources and have 
varying signatures.  
•  One or more routers along the path may not have the 
facility for identifying the upstream source  
•  One may need physical access to some routers to 
enable backtracking.  
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•  Eventually, one starts to cross into other 
administrative domains or countries and encounter 
legal/political obstacles  
But there are some very simple methods to recognize the fact 
that somebody is trying to spoof an IP address. The best way 
to detect this kind of  attack is to monitor the reply to the 
SYN+ACK packet (sent by the victim). If the spoofed host is 
still alive it will return a NACK (RST flag set) which can be 
used to identify this type of attack. Another method is to check 
the acknowledgement number arriving right after the 
SYN+ACK was sent. If the acknowledgment number doesn’t 
comply with the initial sequence number, the attacker is trying 
to guess the ISN.   
 
The significance of this information can be improved by 
packet tracing. And as soon as the host is answering correctly, 
we can be sure that everything is alright. Otherwise, this 
information can be stored and used as forensic-evidence.  
 
1.1. Shell Code- and Polymorphic Shell Code Detection  
 
The primary goal of this analysis is to know that “polymorphic 
shellcode” does exist and may currently be in use by attackers 
to compromise systems. The second goal is to demonstrate the 
use of the tool and how it can be integrated into existing or 
new exploits to change the signature of an exploit as seen by a 
network IDS.  
 
As we know basically, there are two approaches to network 
intrusion detection: signature detection, and anomaly 
detection. The signature detection approach utilizes well-
known signatures for network traffic to identify potentially 
malicious traffic.  
 
Within the signature detection approach, systems typically 
examine traffic using three methods:  
•  Network traffic patterns – A ping from one host to all 
hosts on a subnet. 
•  Protocol analysis – Network traffic that violates the 
RFCs are suspicious. 
•  Signature matching – Network traffic that has certain 
data payloads are marked as a specific probe or 
exploit attempt. 
These methods have proved to be fairly successful. 
Unfortunately, the “weak link” in the above methodologies 
lies with the “signature matching” approach  [6]  . This 
approach primarily relies on “string matching” within network 
traffic. In the interest of performance, IDS systems often look 
for these “known signatures” at exact places in the data 
payload of a packet.  
 
As a result, crackers have developed several techniques that 
allow an attacker to evade such detection. A common trick to 
evade unsophisticated IDS systems is to obfuscate an HTTP 
request by using directory “indirection”.  
 
The remainder of this analysis will briefly introduce the 
concepts of buffer overflow attacks and then explore the 
techniques that ADMmutate uses to evade detection. Finally, 
there will be an analysis of proposed techniques to detect 
“polymorphic shell code”. 
  
 
A large number of remote computer intrusions are conducted 
using a buffer overflow attack. A buffer overflow is a 
programming error where a program does not perform proper 
checking on the input that it processes. A simple example is a 
program that accepts 5 characters for an employee ID. If the 
program doesn’t check the user input, an attacker can enter 20 
characters and cause an error in the program. If the program 
runs with super user privileges, the attacker may be able to 
subvert control of the processor. Due to the mechanics of 
assembly programming, memory allocation, and processor 
architecture a skilled attacker can overwrite critical portions of 
the computer memory and control execution of the CPU [3]. 
 
Once an attacker has found a privileged program that has a 
buffer overflow error, they attempt to construct a buffer 
overflow attack. The construction of a working exploit is not a 
trivial task and generally requires advanced knowledge of 
assembly language, processor architecture, and C 
programming. In simple form, a buffer overflow exploit 
contains the following components [2]:  
•  Processor NOOP/NOP (No Operation) instructions – 
These allow more leniency in getting the memory 
addresses exactly correct in an exploit. On the Intel 
platform the hex value of 0x90 is the most common 
NOOP instruction, although there may be up to 55 
NOOP instructions possible. NOOP instructions are 
commonly chained together into a NOOP “sled” that 
advances the processor’s instruction pointer to the 
place of choice by the attacker. 
•  Shell code  instructions  –  These are the actual 
assembly commands that give remote access to the 
attacker. The most common shell code instruction is 
to execute a shell (such as /bin/sh). Other common 
shell code routines will add a root user account to the 
system, or perform a reverse telnet back to the 
attacker’s machine. 
•  Return address – This is an attacker-supplied value 
that overwrites the correct value in the target 
machine’s computer memory. Getting this value 
correct is the first step in building a buffer overflow 
exploit. Typically this value points to the attacker’s 
NOOP sled, where execution “slides” down to the 
shell code. 
 
To confine the threat of this serious attack, simple mechanisms 
(based on pattern recognition) are adequate means to search 
for evidences like NOP-zones (sequences of  0x90 on Intel 
machines) or known shell code patterns (“ /bin/sh”).  
 
Mechanisms like this can be integrated anywhere in our 
network stacks wherever we have access to the packet-
payload. But in terms of network  and IDS  forensics, we 
always need to know the relationship between suspicious 
contents and their alleged sources. Since IP-addresses are once 
more the only alternative to find a relationship between 
forensic evidences and the real source of suspicious packets, 
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active countermeasures to analyze IP spoofing attempts.  
 
The idea is very simple and can turn the shell code problem in 
a really serious one.  By simply ciphering the shell code and 
attaching a decipher routine, the code can permanently change. 
Thus, it is not possible to use the same signature based 
mechanisms as described before.   
 
A simple instruction call 
execve("/bin/bash",["/bin/bash",null],null)  is normally coded 
as   
 
\x6A\x68\x68\x2F\x62\x61\x73\x68\x2F\x62\x69\ 
x6E\x89\xE3\x31\xD2\x52\x53\x89\xE1\x6A\x0B\  
x58\xCD\x80"   
 
 but can be modified and embedded in a polymorph frame 
(Fig:-2) , looking like the example below[1]. 
 
This mechanism and all its “advantages” compared to 
ordinary shellcode attacks are described by Theo Destrian et al 
[4]. But he also gives some hints about the weak points of this 
mechanism. One of the most interesting one is the fact that this 
method cannot exist without a NOP-zone - even if methods are 
used to hide simple NOPs by one- or two-byte instructions. If 
one-byte instructions are used, the FAKENOP part can be 
detected very easily. Another way is to hide one-  byte 
instructions in an alphanumeric zone [4]. But even this is not 
very efficient, if it is known that the corresponding service 
does not expect alphanumeric input. Another simple idea is the 
use of two-byte instructions, whereas each second byte- is a 
one-byte instruction or the first byte of a two-byte instruction 
(and recursively) [4]. Beside some other problems with this 
approach, a NIDS can make use of this systematic FAKENOP 
byte stream.  
 
 
By looking at the string  
 
\x15\x11\xF8\xFA\x81\xF9\x27\x2F\x90\x9E    we can read [1]: 
ADC $0x11F8FA81 #instruction demanding 4-bytes argument 
STC             #one-byte instructions 
DAA 
DAS 
NOP 
SAHF 
… or by starting from the second byte 
ADC %eax,%edx 
CMP %ecx,$0x272F909E 
 
This is a good example to show that byte-sequences can be found 
-  always resulting in a valid sequence of instructions - 
independent from the starting point of the executable byte stream. 
These byte-sequences are self-aligning with the starting address 
of the subsequent deciphering routines.  
 
In terms of collecting forensic evidences, a mechanism to prevent 
shell code execution is of immense interest, since this is the last 
bastion to defend the most serious threat. If it is not possible to 
defend this “last attack”, traditional forensic analysis is going to 
replace online forensic analysis. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  
There are several difficulties in addressing Intrusion Detection 
Systems with Computer Forensics.  First, the theoretical 
requirements of an IDS in terms of performing its primary 
mission may be at odds with the requirements of collecting an 
preserving forensic evidence.  The primary mission of an IDS 
is to detect and respond to security incidents.  The definition 
of a security incident should be, at least in part, determined by 
the organization’s security policy.  Therefore, the detailed 
definition of the IDS’ primary mission is partially determined 
by the security policy, not by some overarching standard or 
generic procedure.  The result is that there can be a wide 
disparity among requirements for an IDS from organization to 
organization. That contrasts significantly with the relative 
static set of requirements for developing and managing 
evidence for use in a legal proceeding.  
 
A second difficulty is that an IDS, by design, does not manage 
its information in the sense that a forensics systems does.   
There is a requirement within a forensic system for, among 
other things, the maintenance of a chain of custody whereby 
all evidence can be accounted for and its integrity attested to 
from the time of its collection to the time of its use in a legal 
proceeding.  
 
 
The third difficulty deals with the architecture of the IDS.  The 
ability of a program to perform widely disparate tasks implies 
an architecture that may or may not be present currently in an 
IDS.  Thus, there develops the need for a standard architecture 
for intrusion detection systems that also are capable of forensic 
data management.   
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